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The Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942-Doctrinal
Provisions, Defenses, and Theories of Culpability
Dale E. Bennett* and
Cheney C. Joseph, Jr.**
The Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942 was the first major legislative
achievement of the Louisiana State Law Institute.' Prior to 1942 Louis-
iana's substantive criminal law had consisted of numerous overlapping
and sometimes conflicting criminal statutes superimposed upon a basic
system of common law crimes. Unfortunately, the common law defi-
nitions and general guiding principles, taken from the English common
law, were replete with meaningless, fictitious, and artificial distinctions.
In drafting the criminal code, the Law Institute eliminated many of the
obsolete distinctions of the common law, and each crime was fully
defined, with all of its essential elements spelled out in clear and simple
language.
Significant guiding principles were followed in drafting the 1942
Code. Lengthy enumerations, such as those found in the former burglary,
forgery, embezzlement and arson statutes were eliminated, and inclusive
general terms used in their stead. The advantage of careful generalization
over lengthy enumeration was not solely stylistic. It provided a much
more adequate coverage of the prohibited anti-social activity, and has
precluded the defense frequently raised in pre-Code times that the act
or actor involved did not exactly fit within any of the specified enu-
merations. For example, in one early Louisiana case2 the court held that
the burning of a "merry-go-round outfit" was not within an arson
statute which enumerated a long list of objects as the possible subjects
of the offense. It made no difference that the defendant's act was "of
equal atrocity or of a kindred character with those which are enu-
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I. Subsequent Law Institute major projects sponsored have been a complete revision
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2. State v. Fontenot, 112 La. 628, 36 So. 630 (1904). See also discussion of this
problem in Dale E. Bennett and Albert S. Lutz, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
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merated." 3 The drafting of each' definition of a crime was preceded by
a thorough consideration of pertinent court decisions and commentaries-
to the end that the language employed would be broad enough to cover
all intended situations, and yet would not be too inclusive or too
indefinite to meet state and federal constitutional standards.
An important change, effected throughout the Code, was the elim-
ination of minimum penalties, except for a few very serious offenses.
This was in accord with a uniform trend in modern penal legislation
to vest a broader discretion in the sentencing judge-to the end that
he may consider the criminal's age, his physical and mental character-
istics, the chance of rehabilitation, and the special circumstances of the
commission of the crime. All of these matters, as well as the particular
crime committed, should be relevant to sound sentencing procedures.
Not all burglaries and robberies, or burglars and robbers, are identical,
and it was felt that our judges must be given a wide discretion in
administering the sentencing phase of the criminal justice process. The
definitions of and distinctions between substantive crimes are, at best,
general legislative categorizations of criminal responsibility.' Unfortu-
nately, many of the former minimum sentences have been reinstated,
and more have been added by subsequent legislatures, whose desire to
punish severely the commission of a serious crime led them to ignore
the frequent possibility of rehabilitation of some lesser offenders.
A review of the 1942 Criminal Code and the present provisions of
that portion of Title 14 of the Revised Statutes which is still referred
to as "the Criminal Code" reveals that there are relatively few forms
of behavior which were not criminal under the 1942 Code but which
are now covered by a subsequent criminal provision.' The pattern of
amendment to the Criminal Code is one of "repackaging culpability"
to redefine and frequently to punish more severely behavior which was
previously included within an existing offense. 6
In some instances, the repackaging was clearly done to increase the
severity of a lesser offense in order to eliminate difficulties encountered
in proving an aggravating element of the greater offenses.' In order to
3. Fontenot, 112 La. at 642, 36 So. at 635, citing U.S. v. Wiltzberger, 5 Wheat.
9s (1820).
4. See Donald V. Wilson, Making the Punishment Fit the Criminal, 5 La. L. Rev.
53 (1942).
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., simple robbery (La. R.S. 14:65 (1986)), "purse snatching" (La. R.S.
14:65.1 (1986)), simple battery (La. R.S. 14:35 (1986)) and sexual battery (La. R.S. 14:43.1
(1986)).
7. See, e.g., simple burglary (La. R.S. 14:62 (1986)) and unauthorized entry of an
inhabited dwelling (La. R.S. 14:62.3 (1986)). The addition of the unauthorized entry crime
was an obvious response to the supreme court's decision in State v. Jones, 426 So. 2d
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explain, examples of "repackaging culpability" are helpful. This has
occurred frequently in the homicide, rape, robbery, burglary, battery,
and theft "families" of crimes. Typically, the legislature has added new
and more easily proven elements to lesser grades of the crimes and
increased the penalty.
Take a simple example from the series of burglary offenses. Simple
burglary prohibits the "unauthorized entry" into any "structure" with
intent to commit a theft therein.' Due to serious problems with simple
burglaries of homes (not amounting to aggravated burglaries due to the
absence of elements of the greater offense) and a desire to punish simple
burglaries of pharmacies more severely, two new burglary crimes were
added: simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling, 9 and simple burglary
of a pharmacy. 0 Simple burglary encompasses the conduct proscribed
in both new statutes but does not carry the mandatory minimum sentence
of the two new crimes." In essence, the purpose of the enactment was
really only to impose mandatory minimum sentences.
Another simple example arises from the battery series. Simple battery
prohibits the use of force or violence upon the person of another without
his or her consent. 2 No minimum sentence is provided. Between 1981
and 1987, three new crimes were enacted proscribing simple battery of
certain types of victims: policemen, 3 teachers, 4 and child welfare work-
ers." The purpose of the statutes was clearly to provide for mandatory
sentences in those kinds of simple batteries, not to prohibit conduct not
previously defined as criminal under the simple battery statute.'0
1323 (La. 1983) in which the court set aside Jones' conviction based on a finding of
insufficient evidence of intent to steal or commit a felony. Jones was caught inside the
victim's home at night. He was highly intoxicated. Jones was decided in January, 1983.
The new felony of unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling was enacted during the
following legislative session. See 1983 La. Acts No. 285.
8. La. R.S. 14:62 (1986).
9. La. R.S. 14:62.2 (1986).
10. La. R.S. 14:62.1 (1986).
11. The mandatory minimum sentence in both offenses is one year at hard labor
without benefit of probation or parole. La. R.S. 14:62.1, 62.2 (1986).
12. La. R.S. 14:35 (1986).
13. La. R.S. 14:34.2 (1986).
14. La. R.S. 14:34.3 (1986).
15. La. R.S. 14:34.4 (as enacted by 1987 La. Acts No. 902).
16. In all three new offenses, the maximum term of imprisonment is six months
without hard labor, just as in the simple battery statute. However, a fifteen day minimum
sentence without benefit of suspension is required for each of the new offenses. In the
case of "school teacher" battery, a suspended sentence is permissible in lieu of the fifteen
day sentence if the offender is required to perform five days of community service or
serve two days in jail as a condition of suspension.
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The reader may well ask what difference it makes to have a variety
of statutes dealing with specific kinds of offenses which may also be
covered by a "generic" offense. The basic 1942 Criminal Code objective
of providing for judicial discretion in sentencing is not furthered by
proliferation of "special" crimes to deal with the interests of particular
types of victims or particular situations. Certainly, an overview of the
sentencing policy of Louisiana should include consideration of the pe-
culiar risks faced by different types of victims of battery. The fact that
the defendant was aware that the victim was a police officer acting in
the course of duty is very relevant to sentencing and would be given
serious consideration by the sentencing judge. However, it is arguably
no more serious to push a policeman who is trying to control a crowd
at the scene of a fire than it is to push a fireman in an effort to
obstruct his efforts to fight the fire. Thus, there is also a special offense
involving the simple battery of a fireman." Also relevant to sentencing
is the fact that the victim suffered various degrees of physical harm."8
The point is not that the nature of the victim of battery or the
type of structure burglarized should not be considered as aggravating
sentencing factors. These factors, as well as all other relevant factors,
should be weighed in the process of developing a rational, comprehensive
sentencing policy. Hopefully, the penalty issue can be isolated and
evaluated from the broad perspective of the entire sentencing system.
The writers acknowledge that a legitimate argument can be made
for the proposition that the factors most relevant to the "level of
culpability" as reflected by the sentence ought to be included as essential
elements of the offense.' 9 Making these factors elements assures the
17. See La. R.S. 14:327 (1986).
18. The original 1941 Law Institute Report on the Preparation of Project of a Criminal
Code for the State of Louisiana, in the unnumbered articles defining the offenses of
"Aggravated Assault and Battery" and "Simple Assault and Battery," provided that the
penalty for those offenses vary, depending on whether the offense resulted "in serious
personal injury." Almost 40 years later, in the second degree battery statute, the concept
of increasing the penalty exposure for battery depending on intentional infliction of "serious
bodily injury" was incorporated into Louisiana law. See La. R.S. 14:34.1 (1986) (enacted
by 1978 La. Acts No. 394).
19. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 2411 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens said:
It would demean the importance of the reasonable doubt standard-indeed, it
would demean the Constitution itself-if the substance of the standard could be
avoided by nothing more than a legislative declaration that prohibited conduct
is not an "element" of a crime. A legislative definition of an offense named
"assault" could be broad enough to encompass every intentional infliction of
harm by one person upon another, but surely the legislature could not provide
that only that fact must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and then specify
a range of increased punishments if the prosecution could show by a prepon-
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defendant that the state must prove them beyond a reasonable doubt
to the finder of fact at the guilt phase of the proceedings. This also
assures that the traditional rules of evidence will govern the admissibility
of evidence necessary to prove those facts. The traditional evidentiary
rules are generally designed to enhance the reliability of the fact finding
process. Thus, one may argue that it is inappropriate to rely heavily
on factors in determining the sentence when those factors are not in-
cluded within the elements of the offense. The critic would thus say
that the "on duty police" status of the victim should be an element of
an upgraded battery offense if a mandatory minimum fifteen day jail
sentence is to be imposed for battery of a police officer.
There is merit to the idea that a factor which significantly enhances
the severity of an offense should be an element of that offense. This
assures that reliable fact finding will be utilized to determine the existence
of such factors. Thus the process of developing sentencing guidelines"
and restructuring substantive criminal law in conjunction with that effort
requires a careful consideration of Which "aggravating" factors should
be elements of an offense and which should be sentencing factors to
be considered by the judge in the exercise of sentencing discretion.
The elimination of mandatory minimum sentences in the statutes,
and leaving the matter to the development of workable guidelines, would
seem to be the approach most consistent with the original sentencing
philosophy of the 1942 Criminal Code."
The general provisions of Title I are, for the most part, applicable
to all crimes set out in the Code. Most of them will, unless otherwise
clearly indicated by the context of the statute, be applicable to other
crimes created by independent statutes. Thus, this title should be carefully
considered by prospective draftsmen of criminal statutes. The great
majority of the articles codify principles formerly dependent upon ju-
risprudential rules. A few fill gaps in those rules or cover matters in
which our courts had been operating, as one of our respected lawyer
derance of the evidence that the defendant robbed, raped, or killed his victim
"during the commission of the offense."
Id. at 103, 106 S. Ct. at 2425. In McMillan, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
Pennsylvania's "firearm enhancement" statute which required a minimum mandatory five
year sentence for commission of a felony with a firearm. The Pennsylvania statute did
not provide that use of the "firearm" was an element of the offense, but rather was a
sentencing factor to be proven by a preponderance of evidence at the sentencing hearing.
For a discussion of Louisiana's similar statutory scheme, see Cheney C. Joseph, Jr.,
Developments in the Law, 1985-1986-Criminal Procedure, 47 La. L. Rev. 267, 274 (1986).
20. See La. R.S. 15:326 (1992).
21. The development of Louisiana substantive law may, indeed, be significantly af-
fected by the development of sentencing guidelines. Louisiana now has advisory sentencing
guidelines. Those guidelines have taken account of some of the mandatory minimum
sentences provided in the statutes.
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friends would frequently say, "by mainforce and awkwardness." In any
event, a careful study of Title I is essential to an understanding appli-
cation of the Criminal Code.
Article 2 defines certain frequently used terms, the exact meanings
and scope of which might otherwise be uncertain. This eliminated the
necessity of much cumbersome language in subsequent articles defining
the various offenses. The distinction between felonies and misdemeanors,
based upon the possibility of imprisonment at hard labor, is merely a
restatement of the commonly accepted one in this state-as evidenced
by the Louisiana Constitutional jury trial provision2 and Article 933(3)
of the 1966 Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure.
Article 3 epitomizes the "spirit" of the Code. It is purely interpretive.
The method of analogical projection, often permitted in civil statutes,
is not available to extend the scope of the crimes denounced. In con- -
formity with the modern trend away from strict construction of criminal
statutes, Article 3 expressly calls for a natural and logical construction
of the terms employed in defining the Code crimes.
It was inevitable that there might be some overlapping of the various
Code offenses and also of the Code offenses and criminal offenses found
in various parts of the general statute law outside of the Code (since
1950 the Louisiana General Revised Statutes). Article 4 shows a clear
legislative intent that where this occurs both provisions shall be legally
effective and prosecution may be had "under either." A few examples
will serve to illustrate the application of this article. A number of civil
statutes contain penal clauses punishing false statements made under
oath. Such conduct is also punishable as False Swearing under Article
125. In these and other similar situations, prosecution may be under
either, but not under both, provisions. Where the alternative offenses
are basically the same criminal conduct, the offender will be protected
from dual prosecutions by statutory and constitutional double jeopardy
prohibitions."
The effect of adding "specialized offenses" with mandatory penalties
is to add to the arsenal of statutes available to the prosecutor. Thus,
for example, the district attorney can exercise his constitutional prerog-
ative to prosecute on the specific, mandatory penalty statute, such as
simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling, or under the general statute
proscribing simple burglary which carries no mandatory sentence. Because
the district attorney has the authority to accept a guilty plea to the
lesser, non-mandatory penalty statute, the "bargaining power" of the
district attorney has been enhanced.2
22. See former La. Const. art. Vii, § 41 (1921) and La. Const. art. 1, § 17 (1974).
23. La. Const. art. I. § 15 (1974); La. Code Crim. P. art. 591.
24. La. Code Crim. P. art. 558; La. Const. art. V, § 26(B).
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These statutes have the effect of shifting some of the traditional
judicial discretion regarding imposition of sentence from the sentencing
court to the district attorney.
Article 5 restated and codified a well-settled jurisprudential rule
which permitted prosecution for lesser and included offenses. Thus, the
district attorney may receive a plea of guilty for a lesser and included
offense where he feels, as a practical matter, that a conviction of the
greater offense actually committed would be highly improbable. Then
too, it should never be a defense for a defendant to assert that an
aggravating element was present, making him guilty of a more serious
crime. For example, it would not be a defense to a person charged
with simple robbery to prove that, having used a dangerous weapon,
he was guilty of the more serious crime of armed robbery.
The second sentence of Article 5 codified the established responsive
verdict rule which authorizes conviction of "lesser and included of-
fenses." The Reporters' Comment gave the following examples of re-
sponsive verdicts: "Aggravated battery-simple battery or aggravated
assault-simple assault; Murder-manslaughter-negligent homicide." Also,
conviction of the lesser crime of an "attempt" to commit the offense
charged was listed as an appropriate responsive verdict. Shortly after
the Code went into effect, trial judges reported that juries were often
confused by the large number of possible crimes they were instructed
to consider as responsive verdicts. Sometimes the verdict returned, like
negligent homicide in a clearly intentional killing, was clearly inappro-
priate to the facts of the case. After a careful study of this problem,
the general responsive verdicts provision of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure was amended to specify appropriate responsive verdicts for the
most common crimes, with the deletion of some included offenses where
those verdicts were so numerous as to be mind-boggling to a jury.'
For example, the specific responsive verdicts for murder omitted the
formerly appropriate verdicts of negligent homicide and attempted mur-
der. Originally, the only listed responsive included offense for aggravated
battery was simple battery. It is noteworthy that while an attempt will
generally be treated as a lesser and included offense, some attempts
were not included in the statutory list of specific responsive verdicts.
There have also been a few other instances in which the legislature
has included in the Code of Criminal Procedure responsive offenses
which are not lesser included offenses of the offense charged. Those
situations involve responsive offenses which require proof of elements
25. The revised responsive verdicts provision, former R.S. 15:386, was included, with
only very minor changes, in the 1966 Code of Criminal Procedure as Article 814.
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not required to prove the offense charged.36 For example, aggravated
battery is a responsive offense to an indictment charging attempted
second degree murder. The principal offense does not require proof of
the use of force of violence on the person of another or the use of a
dangerous weapon, both of which are elements of aggravated battery.
2
"
In response to this situation, Article 814 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure was amended to permit the court to exclude a responsive
verdict if the evidence presented '"is not sufficient reasonably to permit
a finding of guilty to the responsive offense." For example, if the
defendant fired a shot at the victim with a specific intent to kill the
victim, but missed, he could be guilty of attempted second degree murder
but not aggravated battery. However, if the bullet struck the victim in
the foot, the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant was guilty
only of aggravated battery due to a failure of the evidence to convince
the jurors that defendant actively desired to kill the victim, rather than
to strike him in the foot, thereby inflicting a non-fatal wound.
Articles 10 through 12 codify traditional and well-settled principles
as to the intent element of crimes-an element that was treated with
great care in the Code offenses. In some crimes a specific knowledge
or intent is required; in others a general criminal intent or even criminal
negligence will suffice. In a few offenses the mere act or failure to act
is punishable. Under Article 10, a specifc criminal intent exists where
the criminal consequence was "actively desired." A general criminal
intent will be found in all cases where there is a specific intent, and
also where it appears that the offender "must have adverted to the
prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result." For
example, the roomer who sets fire to a trunk in his quarters, in order
to defraud an insurance company, might well be convicted of the serious
offense of aggravated arson." Aggravated arson only requires a general
criminal intent, which is supplied by the fact that the offender "must
have adverted" that the burning of the dwelling was "reasonably certain
to result" from the fire he set.29 Similarly, a motorist who drove into
a crowd of celebrating fans dancing in the street after a football victory
would be guilty of aggravated battery if he ran over one of the dancers
even though he did not actively desire that result, hoping that the dancers
would jump out of the path of his car. The battery offense only requires
a general intent, 0 which is satisfied if the driver must have known that
26. Some examples included in the listing of responsive verdicts found in La. Code
Crim. P. art. 814(A) (1986) are: Attempted First Degree Murder, Attempted Second Degree
Murder, and Attempted Manslaughter. All have aggravated battery as a response offense,
although aggravated battery is not a lesser included offense for any of the three.
27. La. R.S. 14:33, 34 (1986).
28. La. Crim. Code art. 51 (1942).
29. See People v. Fanshawe, 32 N.E. 1102 (N.Y. 1893).
30. La. Crim. Code art. 33 (1942).
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he was reasonably certain to strike one of the celebrating fans. An
important guide to a determination of whether a specific or general
intent is required is the provision found in the last sentence of Article
11. When the terms "intent" or "intentional" are used without qual-
ification in the definition of an offense they refer only to "general
criminal intent as defined (in Article 10)."'"
The "intentional" and "with intent to" formulation has not been
construed by the supreme court in a consistent manner, thereby creating
some significant degree of uncertainty regarding these mental elements.
For example, in State v. Raymo, 32 the supreme court purported to hold
that forgery, the very example given of a specific intent crime in the
comments to Article 11, was a general intent crime. Similarly, in State
v. Chism,33 the supreme court said that accessory after the fact is a
general intent crime. Both the forgery and accessory articles employ the
"with intent to" formulation.
In a similar vein, the supreme court has found that some crimes
whose definition uses the "intentional" general intent formulation were
specific intent crimes. In State v. Fuller,34 the supreme court said that
second degree battery, defined in terms of the "intentional infliction of
serious bodily injury," was a specific intent crime. Also, earlier in State
v. Fluker," the supreme court found the illegal carrying of weapons
statute, which prohibits "intentional concealment," to be a specific intent
crime.These examples of the confusion created by the failure to set forth
in specific statutory terms the intent requirement within each criminal
statute is unfortunate. With a code, such as Louisiana's, courts should
be able to follow the formulation set forth in a general provision like
Article 11. The failure of the supreme court to follow Article 11 in
these cases, thereby creating uncertainty, probably suggests the need for
revision to clarify.
Due to the legislature's understandable tendency to "borrow" stat-
utory formulations from other jurisdictions, the mental elements of
"wilfully" and "knowingly" have also found their way into Louisiana's
criminal statutes, particularly in the area of the Uniform Controlled
Dangerous Substances Act. The criminal provisions of the Act prohibiting
possession frequently prescribe the "knowing" or "intentional" posses-
sion of specified controlled substances. The term "intentional" obviously
31. Arson is defined in Articles 51 and 52 of the Criminal Code as the "intentional"
setting fire to the property or structure. Similarly Battery is defined in Article 33 as "the
intentional use of force or violence upon the person of another."
32. 419 So. 2d 858 (La. 1982).
33. 436 So. 2d 464 (La. 1983).
34. 414 So. 2d 306 (La. 1982).
35. 311 So. 2d 863 (La. 1975).
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refers to general criminal intent-an aversion to the consequences as
reasonably certain to follow. However, the term "knowingly" would
seem to require a subjective awareness of the nature of the substance,
not simply a reasonable likelihood that the offender must have known,
or facts from which an offender ought to have known. However, the
use of the two terms in the disjunctive ("knowingly or intentionally")
seems to allow the state to prove guilt if the offender ought to have
known both that the substance was under his dominion or control and
that the substance was of a particular nature. No Louisiana court has
suggested that "knowingly" requires the state to prove subjective knowl-
edge that the substance fell within a particular schedule or category of
criminally proscribed substances.
The definition of "Criminal Negligence" in Article 12, requiring "a
gross deviation below the standard of care expected to be maintained
by a reasonably careful man under like circumstances," is in accord
with the usual conception of that term. It calls for substantially more
than the ordinary lack of care which may be the basis of civil liability.
Article 14, which states the formula for the insanity defense, was
one of the most controversial articles of the Code. That was not sur-
prising. It is universally agreed that an offender is not criminally re-
sponsible if he was so insane at the time he committed the act that he
was incapable of entertaining a criminal intent; but there is and was
much disagreement as to the proper way to submit that issue to the
jury. Article 14 restated the familiar "right and wrong" test. This test,
which originated in the celebrated M'Naghten's Case,3 6 then prevailed
in Louisiana 7 and a majority of American jurisdictions3" as the sole
test of criminal responsibility. Thus, if, because of mental disease or
defect, the accused was without the capacity to distinguish between right
and wrong with respect to the conduct in question, he is exempt from
criminal responsibility. Some states have broadened the scope of the
insanity defense by excusing the defendant who may have known that
the act was wrong, but was "irresistibly impelled" to its commission
by reason of mental disease or defect.3 9 The so-called "product" test
of the federal court in Durham v. United States was also considered
and rejected.4 Such a liberalized test may be theoretically and scientif-
ically sound, but as a practical matter it opens the door to further abuse
of the already overworked insanity defense.4 ' It was generally agreed by
36. 1 Car. 2 K. 130, 10 Clark & F. 200 (1843).
37. State v. Tapie, 173 La. 780, 138 So. 665 (1931).
38. William Clark and William Marshall, Law of Crimes, at 123 n.375 § 84 (4th ed.
1940).
39. Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577 (1887).
40. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. App. 1954), where insanity was a defense if the criminal act
was "a product" of a mental disease or defect.
41. Clark and Marshall, supra note 38, at 128 and 129; questioning the practical
efficacy of the so-called "irresistible impulse" test.
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experienced judges who served as advisors in the preparation of the
Code that the "right and wrong" test came as close to stating an
understandable guide for the jury as any which could be devised. Where
there was real mental defect, whether it took the form of an irresistible
impulse, special mental delusion, or inability to appreciate the wrongness
of the defendant's act, evidence of such condition could be channeled
into the Louisiana criterion of "ability to distinguish between right and
wrong with reference to the conduct in question. '4
Experience of the past fifty years has borne out the wisdom of that
decision. Not only has the Louisiana test remained intact, but in 1972
the federal appellate court which adopted the Durham test abandoned
the test in United States v. Brawner .4 Further, the United States Congress
in 1984 adopted an amended insanity defense in 18 U.S.C. § 17 which
is in many significant respects very close to the Louisiana formulation
of the M'Naughten test."
Article 15 codified the well-settled general rule that voluntary drunk-
enness or use of drugs does not exempt an offender from criminal
responsibility. However, where an offense requires a specific knowledge
or intent, an inebriated or drugged offender may defend on the basis
that he was incapable of entertaining the required intent or knowledge.
Thus, a drunken defendant might defend against a theft charge by
showing he had no specific intent to permanently deprive the owner of
the property taken. Conversely, the same defendant would have no
defense to unauthorized use of movables (the property), since that offense
requires no specific intent or knowledge. Where insanity (delirium tre-
mens) has resulted from protracted drinking, the right and wrong test
of Article 14 will apply. The courts do not look to the cause when true
insanity exists.45 Thus, a distinction exists between the culpability of a
defendant who is "crazy drunk" and one who is "crazy" from previous
drinking.
The Code continued the traditional distinction between mistake of
fact and mistake of law. Article 16 provides that, unless otherwise
provided in the definition of a crime, reasonable ignorance or mistake
of fact may preclude the presence of a required mental element and
thus constitute a defense. For example, the misappropriation of another's
cow under a reasonable belief that it was part of the defendant's milk
herd would not constitute theft. Conversely ignorance or mistake of
42. La. Crim. Code art. 14 (1942).
43. 471 F.2d 969 (D.D.C. 1972).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1988) provides, in pertinent part, that
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at
the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant,
as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the
nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts.
45. State v. Haab, 105 La. 230, 29 So. 725 (1901).
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law, subject to well-settled exceptions stated in Article 17, is not a
defense.
Articles 18 through 22 codified justification rules which had pre-
viously only been available through research of the somewhat inadequate
jurisprudence. Article 18 outlines a number of situations where conduct,
otherwise criminal, is justifiable. More specifically, it covers compulsion,
physical impossibility, and public, domestic and other lawful authority.
The most important, or at least the most litigated, instances of justi-
fication, defense of person and property, are treated in considerable
detail in Articles 19 through 22. Questions of "reasonable necessity"
and "reasonable force" could not be codified in more detail and will
necessarily be determined by the widely varying facts of the case at
hand.
The question of the necessity of retreating in order to justify a
killing in self-defense gave the Reporters considerable concern. American
writers were in considerable doubt as to the proper rule or prevailing
doctrine.46 Louisiana had generally recognized a duty to retreat, but
with many unclear qualifications. 47 Article 20(1) expresses no specific
retreat formula. It simply requires that the defendant must have had a
reasonable belief that the killing was necessary. The possibility of retreat,
along with the possibility of prevention by less force than killing, is
merely one of the factors that should be considered in the ultimate
question of the apparent necessity for the force employed.
The "justifiable homicide" provisions of Article 20 were subse-
quently amended to include two additional situations not included in
the original code. Article 20(3)48 permits a person to kill when he
"reasonably believes" that the person killed is committing or attempting
to commit a burglary of a dwelling or business and is "likely to use
any unlawful force against a person present." Arguably this provision
permits the owner or occupant of the burglarized premises to kill the
intruder even if not in fear of death or great bodily harm at the hands
of the burglar. The term "any unlawful force" is broad enough to
cover killing a burglar who the occupant believes may merely intend to
commit a simple battery upon the occupant in an effort to escape from
the scene.
Even more expansive of the "shoot to kill" philosophy regarding
burglars is the language of recently amended Article 20(4). 49 That pro-
vision significantly varies from the original code in that under its lan-
guage the lawful occupant of a dwelling may kill to prevent any unlawful
46. Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 Harv. L. Rev. 567
(1902).
47. State v. West, 45 La. Ann. 14, 12 So. 7 (1893); State v. Thompson, 45 La.
Ann. 969, 13 So. 392 (1893), State v. Robertson, 50 La. Ann. 92, 23 So. 9 (1898).
48. As added by 1976 La. Acts No. 655, and amended by 1977 La. Acts No. 392.
49. As added by 1983 La. Acts No. 234.
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entry as long as it is reasonably believed that the use of the deadly
force is "necessary to prevent the entry or to compel the intruder to
leave the premises." This provision makes no reference to any concern
with the intruder's possible use of force against a person.
Prior Louisiana jurisprudence had held that the person who inter-
vened in protection of another stood in the shoes of the person protected
and had only his actual rights of defense.10 Article 22 adopted the more
liberal and common sense view, consistent with the objective test adopted
in the other articles on defense, that the intervenors acts are justifiable
if he does what is "reasonably apparent that the party attacked might
have done in his own behalf."'"
The Louisiana Criminal Code adopted an approach to self defense
and defense of others which focuses on the result in determining the
appropriate test to utilize, rather than focusing on the nature of the
force employed (i.e. "deadly" versus "non-deadly" force). The special
and more rigorous justification test of Article 20 is applied when the
defendant accidentally, or intentionally, killed the assailant either in self
defense or to prevent a violent or forcible felony. The broader and
more liberal "reasonable and apparently necessary" test of Article 19
is applied only if the resultant injuries do not produce death. In some
respects, this may seem unfairly 'to punish the person who accidentally
kills while using force which, if not resulting in death, might otherwise
be deemed "reasonable and apparently necessary." However, the Louis-
iana Code's provision seems to have produced just results. There is no
reported case where harsh results were achieved, and no suggestions for
change of the Criminal Code's provisions have been submitted in the
period of fifty years since the Code's adoption.
An interesting feature of the Louisiana justification provisions of
Articles 18 through 22 is the failure of the redactors to address the
issue of burden of proof. One of the most interesting questions posed
by the 1942 Criminal Code's redefinition of the crime of murder arises
in connection with the issue of the burden of proof in cases of self
defense. The jurisprudence places the burden on the state to disprove
self defense; that is, the state must negate the defense by proof beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self defense. 2 The
cases can be traced back to the pre-Code era when the mental element
50. State v. Giroux, 26 La. Ann. 582 (1874); Steve v. Atkins, 136 La. 844, 67 So.
926 (1915).
51. This was generally considered as the better view. Amer. Law Inst. Restatement
of the Law of Torts (1934) § 76; John W. May, Criminal Law 74, § 62 (4th ed. 1938).
52. For an excellent discussion of the burden of proof in homicide and non-homicide
cases, without resolving the issue, see Justice Calogero's opinion in State v. Freeman,
427 So. 2d 1161 (La. 1983).
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of murder was the common law's "malice aforethought."" Clearly, at
common law, a self defensive state of mind was inconsistent with "mal-
ice.'' 4 Thus self defense defeated the state of mind required for murder.
In proving that the defendant killed with "malice," the State had to
show that his action was not in self defense. Pre-Code Louisiana de-
cisions, such as State v. Ardoin," clearly reflect this theory.
In defining murder as a "specific intent" killing,' 6 the legislature
eliminated the inconsistency between a defendant having an "active
desire" to kill (or inflict great bodily harm) 7 and nevertheless believing
reasonably that such killing is necessary to save himself (or another).58
The two states of mind (specific intent and self defense) can coexist
without the prior inconsistency. Nevertheless, Louisiana courts, following
the enactment of the 1942 Criminal Code, continued to cite the pre-
Code cases for the proposition that the state must negate self defense
when the issue is "raised" by the evidence. 9
Recently, in State v. Cheatwood, Justice Lemmon, in an extensive
footnote, outlined the theoretical distinction between defenses which
defeat essential elements of offenses and those which negate culpability,
"despite the state's proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all the essential
elements."16' For example, intoxication and mistake of fact are cate-
gorized under the first group, because they are "element defeating"
defenses. On the other hand, the justification defenses of Articles 18
through 22 in effect add a "mitigatory factor" which eliminates cul-
pability despite proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all essential elements
of the offense. These latter defenses are "culpability defeating" as
opposed to "element defeating."
The Cheatwood footnote concludes that, in such cases of true af-
firmative defenses, the legislature intended only to require the State to
carry the burden of proving the elements of the offense and to require
the defendant to prove the mitigatory factor. The footnote correctly
53. See State v. Ardoin, 128 La. 14, 54 So. 407 (1911).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See La. Crim. Code art. 30, enacted by 1942 La. Acts No. 43. See also La.
R.S. 14:30.1(1) (1986), as amended by 1979 La. Acts No. 74.
57. The "specific intent killings" defined in La. R.S. 14:30 (1986) and La. R.S.
14:30.1(1) (1986) require the State to prove that the offender acted with a specific intent
to kill or inflict great bodily harm. Specific intent is defined by La. R.S. 14:10 (1986)
in terms of an offender acting with an "active desire" to produce certain criminal
consequences.
58. La. R.S. 14:19 (1986) and La. R.S. 14:20(1) (1986) set forth the statutory defenses
of self defense.
59. See, e.g., State v. Freeman, 427 So. 2d 1161 (La. 1983).
60. 458 So. 2d 907 (La. 1984).
61. Id. at 910 n.4.
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refers to the State's "constitutional and statutory burden of proving
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.''62 The statutory law does not require
the State to disprove exculpatory circumstances.63
This position became the rationale for Judge Wicker's opinion in
State v. Barnes, in which the fifth circuit affirmed a conviction for
aggravated battery." In Barnes, the trial court instructed the jury that
"the burden of proving that the use of force or violence is justified in
62. Id.
63. The pertinent text of this footnote is as follows:
In Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S. Ct. 2319 (1977), the Court
said:
"[Tlhe Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the
offense of which defendant is charged. Proof of the non-existence of all
affirmative defenses has never been constitutionally required .... ." 97 S.
Ct. at 2327.
Except in a few specific instances, such as La. R.S. 14:63 (tres-
passing), La.R.S. 14:69 (possession of stolen property) and La.R.S. 14:14
(insanity), Louisiana statutory criminal law does not directly address the
burden of proof for "defenses." Nevertheless, there is a logical distinction
between those defenses which actually defeat an essential element of the
offense and those defenses which present exculpatory circumstances that
defeat culpability, despite the state's proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of all the essential elements. In the first category are defenses such as
intoxication (La.R.S. 14:15) and mistake of fact (La. R.S. 14:16), which
preclude the presence of a mental element of the offense. When such
defenses are raised by the evidence, the state must overcome the defense
by evidence which proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the mectal
element was present despite the alleged intoxication or mistake of fact.
Otherwise, the state would fail to meet its constitutional and statutory
burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of
the offense charged. La. Const. Art. I § 16 (1974); La.C.Cr.P. Art. 804;
La.R.S. 15:271. However, defenses such as justification (La. R.S. 14:18)
are truly "affirmative" defenses, because they do not negate any element
of the offense. Compare United States v. Mitchell, 725 F.2d 832 (2nd
Cir. 1983) with State v. Burrow, 293 Or. 691, 653 P.2d 226 (1982); see
also Model Penal code, Proposed First Draft No. I, § 1.12(2) (1961).
It is logical to conclude that the Legislature intended to require the state
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt only the elements of the offense and to
require defendant to prove by preponderance of evidence the exculpatory cir-
cumstances constituting the "affirmative" defense. See W. Lafave & A. Scott,
Criminal Law § 8 (1972). The statutory provisions setting forth the state's
burden of proof refer only to the requirement that the state prove the elements
of the crime-not that the state disprove the exculpatory circumstances constituting
defenses which defeat criminal culpability despite proof of the presence of all
elements of the offense. See La.R.S. 15:271; La.C.Cr.P. Art. 804; former
La.C.Cr.P. Arts. 263 and 387 (1928). See also State v. Freeman, 427 So. 2d
1161 (La. 1983), Lemmon, J., concurring.
458 So. 2d at 910 n.4.
64. 491 So. 2d 42 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
1992] 1097
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
non-homicide cases is on the defendant and need only be established
by a preponderance of the evidence." 65 Judge Wicker's opinion is care-
fully written and thoroughly analyzes the issues. He has squarely ad-
dressed the issue of legislative intent to allocate the burden to the
defendant. The issue of the constitutionality of such a legislative allo-
cation is also a critical issue and has been resolved by the United State
Supreme Court in Martin v. Ohio." The United States Supreme Court
upheld such an allocation of the burden for those states with statutory
schemes in which self defense defeats no elements of the offense. The
Louisiana Supreme Court will eventually have to decide whether the
Louisiana Legislature intended such a result. Justice Lemmon's Cheat-
wood footnote and Judge Wicker's application of that theory certainly
make sense. Nevertheless, the legislature may indeed have intended to
require the State to shoulder the full burden of proof regarding the
culpability of the accused. The court must squarely decide whether the
legislature meant to require the State not only to prove all elements of
the offense, but also to prove the non-existence of mitigating factors
which, if present, will lower or eliminate the level of culpability.
The 1942 Code followed the established legislative policy of rec-
ognizing only two classes of parties to crimes, i.e., principals and ac-
cessories after the fact. 67 The Louisiana Legislature recognized at an
early stage the difficulties inherent in the distinction between the doer
(principal at common law) and the procurer or pre-crime aider (accessory
before the fact), and that these difficulties were not compensated for
by any sound reason for the distinction. After a series of earlier statutes
had failed to effectively abolish this distinction, a 1932 statute was
enacted which explicitly and effectively provided that all persons con-
cerned with the commission of a crime were principals.6 8 That statute
was the basis of the broad definition of "Principals" in Article 24.
Under this definition it is clear that anyone who procures, or assists
in, the commission of a crime may be indicted and tried as a principal.
While such an offender may be tried before the doer (common law
principal), or even though the doer is dead or out of the jurisdiction,
,the state must still prove the fact of the guilt of the alleged doer, for
one cannot procure or assist in a crime which was not committed. Thus,
the redactors of the code anticipated that Louisiana courts will continue
to hold that an alleged procurer (common law accessory before the fact)
cannot be convicted where the alleged doer (common law principal) has
actually been tried and acquitted. 69
65. Id. at 44.
66. 480 U.S. 228, 107 S. Ct. 1098 (1987).
67. La. Crim. Code an. 23 (1942).
68. 1932 La. Acts No. 120, Dart's Crim. Stats. arts. 237.1-237.2 (Supp. 1941).
69. State v. St. Phillip, 169 La. 468, 125 So. 451 (1929); State v. Prudhomme, 171
La. 143, 129 So. 736 (1930).
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However, in some cases, the principal offender may have been
acquitted at his trial due to technicalities often related to the admissibility
of evidence. Whether this acquittal should preclude the state from again
endeavoring to prove the guilt of the principal offender at the aider
and abettor's (principal) trial was addressed by the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Standefer.70 The Court held that the acquittal
of one of the offenders does not bar prosecution of the other. The
State may try again to establish the guilt of the offender upon whose
guilt the guilt of the other offender is dependent.
Whether the Supreme Court's approach in federal criminal cases
will be adopted in Louisiana remains to be seen. Louisiana jurisprudence
has evolved which, in the writers' opinion, correctly requires the state
to prove that the principals acted with the same mental state. Thus, in
State v. McAllister,7 the supreme court held that two offenders acting
in concert could be guilty of different offenses if they acted with different
states of mind. In McAllister, a murder case, the court noted that one
offender acting in the heat of passion spurred by adequate provocation
might only be guilty of manslaughter, while his "cool headed" aider
and abettor could be guilty of murder.
In similar fashion, if two offenders took an automobile without the
permission of the owner one could be guilty of theft if he intended to
permanently deprive and the other guilty of unauthorized use if he only
intended to wrongfully use and return the vehicle.
In State v. Holmes72 and State v. West," the Louisiana Supreme
Court clearly spelled out the requirement that, in cases of specific intent
crimes, each alleged principal must be proven to have acted with an
"active desire" to produce the criminal consequences prescribed by the
offense.
Because the co-conspiracy theory of culpability as expressed in the
case of Pinkerton v. United States' and as is arguably expressed in
Section 455 of Title 15, '7 was not incorporated into the 1942 Criminal
Code, the so-called "Pinkerton Doctrine" may have no force in Louis-
iana. Under the so-called "Pinkerton Doctrine" co-conspirators are crim-
70. 447 U.S. 10, 100 S. Ct. 1999 (1980).
71. 366 So. 2d 1340 (La. 1978).
72. 388 So. 2d 722 (La. 1980).
73. 568 So. 2d 1019 (La. 1990).
74. 328 U.S. 640, 66 S. Ct. 1180 (1946).
75. La. R.S. 14:455 (1986) provides that
Each co-conspirator is deemed to assent to or to commend whatever- is said or
done in furtherance of the common enterprise, and it is therefore of no moment
that such act was done or such declaration was made out of the presence of
the conspirator sought to be bound thereby, or whether the conspirator doing
such act or making such declaration be or be not on trial with his co-defendant.
But to have this effect, a prima facie case of conspiracy must have been
established.
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inally liable for offenses foreseeably committed by fellow conspirators
in furtherance of the common goal of the conspiracy. The state of mind
required for "co-conspiracy liability" is thus one of "foreseeability." ' 6
That would clearly not suffice in cases of specific intent crimes, which
require proof of an "active desire," not mere "foreseeability" of pro-
duction of consequences.
Although both West and Holmes involved specific intent crimes, the
specific application of Section 455 and the "Pinkerton Doctrine" was
not directly presented. Nevertheless, the supreme court treated the issue
as though the principal theory of Article 24 was the sole basis for
criminal liability for the acts of another. Whether the supreme court
will reject the coconspirator doctrine as not applicable in Louisiana due
to its failure to be included in the Code remains to be seen because
the issue has never been directly presented.
Further, whether the supreme court may accept the "foreseeable
offense in furtherance" theory in cases involving only general criminal
intent or criminal negligence remains to be seen. If the offense which
the conspirators plan to commit is a felony, and an unintentional death
results from the actions of a co-conspirator, then the felony murder or
felony manslaughter doctrine will provide the basis for criminal liability."
If the offense forseeably committed in furtherance of the conspiracy
only requires general intent (such as aggravated battery or aggravated
criminal damage to property) or criminal negligence (such as criminally
negligent use of a dangerous weapon under Article 94), the court may
treat the state of mind (foreseeability) required for co-conspiracy liability
as equivalent to that required for general intent (aversion to consequences
as reasonably certain to follow) or criminal negligence (gross disregard
of reasonably foreseeable risks), and may thus apply the "Pinkerton
Doctrine" to impose criminal liability for general intent or criminal
negligence offenses committed in the furtherance of the common criminal
scheme.
76. La. Crim. Code art. 2 (1942) defined "foreseeable" as referring "to that which
ordinarily be anticipated by a human being of average reasonable intelligence and per-
ception."
77. La. R.S. 14:30.1(2) (1986) defines Second.Degree Murder as the "killing of a
human being" while the
offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated
rape, aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated
escape, armed robbery, or simple robbery, even though he has no intent to kill
or to inflict great bodily harm.
Similarly, La. Crim Code art. 30(2) (1942) provided that
Murder is the killing of a human being,
... When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration
of aggravated arson, burglary ... , aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape,
armed robbery, or simple robbery, even though he has no intent to kill.
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The accessory after the fact comes into the picture after a felony
has been committed. His criminal act is aiding, harboring or concealing
the offender or his criminal activity. Generally speaking, virtually any
aid given to the felon, such as furnishing a car, shelter or money to
evade detection or arrest, will make the person assisting an accessory
after the fact. Activities authorized by law, such as the efforts of an
attorney on behalf of the accused, would constitute justifiable conduct.7"
Prior to the Code, the existing Louisiana statutes were inadequate,
but the reporters were fortunate to find several well-drafted statutes in
other jurisdictions. These, along with relevant treatise material, served
as a pattern for Article 25. The common law rule, which had prevailed
in Louisiana, required actual knowledge that the person aided had
committed a felony. Proof of such knowledge could be very difficult,
for the aider would purport to be scrupulously unaware of the guilt of
the one he aided. Under Article 25, it is sufficient that the accessory
knew or had "reasonable ground to believe" that the person assisted
had committed a felony. Paragraph two expressly provides that the trial
of the principal shall not be a prerequisite to trial of an accessory after
the fact. The fact that the principal has not been tried, or is for some
reason (such as death, present insanity or absence from the state) not
amenable to justice, should not prevent trial of one who harbored him
or otherwise assisted him in evading justice. It is still necessary, however,
to establish the principal's guilt, for liability of the accessory is directly
dependant upon the guilt of the person aided.79
The general conspiracy and attempt articles provide a very useful
device for law enforcement. They enable the state to curb criminal
activity by dealing with the planned criminal activity before the intended
offense is actually completed. Also, where proof of the consummated
crime is difficult, the state may choose to prosecute for the lesser inchoate
offense with a greater probability of securing a conviction.
Article 26 was based upon a 1940 general conspiracy statute. While
there was some ambiguity in that statute," the new criminal conspiracy
article made it abundantly clear that a conspiracy to commit any crime
is covered. Specific intent is an essential element of a criminal conspiracy,
for that offense "is heavily mental in composition."'" The requirement
that the agreement or combination must be "for the specific purpose
of committing any crime" should be interpreted in light of the general
78. La. Crim. Code art. 18(3) (1942).
79. Note, 25 Mich. L. Rev. 301, 302 (1927). See also State v. Jackson, 344 So. 2d
961 (La. 1977), in which the court held that mere failure to report an offense was not
sufficient to commit the offense of accessory after the fact.
80. 1940 La. Acts No. 16 (Dart's Crim. Stats. § 839.21 (Supp. 1941). See, James
Bugea, Carlos Lazarus and William Peques, Louisiana Legislation of 1940, 3 La. L. Rev.
98, 157 (1940).




mistake provisions of the code. Under Article 16, a reasonable mistake
of fact might preclude the required specific intent and constitute a
defense. However, under Article 17, a mistake as to the legal nature
or effects of the conduct planned would not constitute a defense to a
criminal prosecution.
At common law only an unlawful combination or agreement was
necessary for a criminal conspiracy, and subsequent change of heart did
relieve a participant from liability. 2 The 1942 Code's conspiracy article
adopted an additional requirement, found in the 1940 Louisiana statute
and in a majority of other conspiracy statutes, that one of the con-
spirators must do an act in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy.
This additional element serves to guarantee the genuineness of the crim-
inal agreement, and to preclude prosecution of those who bonafidedly
withdraw before the offense has gone beyond the talking stage.
The Code did not endeavor to codify a doctrine of withdrawal like
that found in the Model Penal Code.83 Rather, the matter was left to
the courts to develop. Arguably, given the structure of the Louisiana
conspiracy and attempt articles, particularly with respect to the "overt
act" requirements, an offender is guilty of the conspiracy or attempt
if the "overt act" requirement is met after the formulation of specific
criminal intent to complete the intended offense (and, in cases of con-
spiracy, a true "bilateral" combination of minds occurs)." The offen-
der's withdrawal would thus only relieve the offender of culpability for
the completed offense (if completed by a co-conspirator or aider and
abettor). The withdrawal would also be a proper factor to consider in
mitigation of sentence.
Nevertheless, the test for such withdrawal is still left to the courts
to develop. Whether a mere uncommunicated "change of heart" would
suffice remains to be seen. Obviously, in cases of attempts, if the
offender is acting alone, even a "change of heart" arising as a result
of fear of apprehension would prevent the completed offense from being
committed. However, in cases of multiple actors where, despite the
alleged "change of heart" Withdrawal, one of the offenders completes
the offense, a very different picture is presented. In such an instance,
the Louisiana courts would be required, due to the absence of specific
guidance from the Code, to look to the "common law" or to the
various formulations, such as the Model Penal Code," to develop a test
which will produce a fair and just result. At a minimum, a requirement
of communicating the intent to withdraw to the co-actors at a point
82. Clark and Marshal, supra note 38, at 168, 169, §§ 126, 127.
83. See M.P.C. § 5.01(4), (6).
84. See State v. Joles, 485 So. 2d 212 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
85. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
1102 (Vol. 52
LOUISIANA CRIMINAL CODE OF 1942
when they too could desist from the criminal purpose would seem
appropriate."
The general attempt provision in Article 27 was an important in-
novation in Louisiana criminal law. Existing statutes had provided only
a random coverage of the offense. Attempts to commit murder, man-
slaughter, rape and robbery were punishable under separate aggravated
assault statutes. s7 Occasionally a criminal statute expressly included the
person who attempted to commit the offense. In the absence of such
a provision, the offender who merely attempted to commit a crime went
unpunished. Article 27 embraced an attempt to commit any crime,
whether a felony or a misdemeanor. This broad provision .has been
widely utilized to punish obvious wrongdoers who were apprehended
before their crime was complete or where proof of all elements of the
completed crime was difficult.
The attempt definition requires a "specific intent" to commit the
crime, and an "overt act" directed (i.e. "tending directly") toward that
end. The requisite specific intent may be inferred from the circum-
stances-as specific intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a
deadly weapon in a deadly way.88 The subjective mental intent element
is all-important, and it is expressly stated that an apparent, rather than
actual, ability to commit the crime is sufficient. An attempted homicide
may fail because the gun is defective or the poison is not sufficiently
deadly, or an attempted theft may fail because the cash drawer looted
or the pocket picked is empty. Where such conditions are unknown to
the offender, they will not prevent his being guilty of an attempt.
During the period since the Code's adoption, very little helpful
jurisprudence has arisen regarding the problems of the so-called "im-
possible attempt."' 9 For example, suppose that the offender purchases
goods reasonably believing them to have been the subject of a theft or
robbery. In the event that the goods were not actually stolen, but rather
were being sold to the offender (a suspected "fence" for stolen property)
during a police "sting" operation, the offender is clearly not guilty of
the completed offense of receiving stolen things. If the goods were not
86. See State v. Taylor, 173 La. 1010, 139 So. 463 (1932).
87. See Dart's Crim. Stats. §§ 764-67, 775 (1932).
88. In State v. Lee, 275 So. 2d 757 (La. 1973), a conviction of attempted murder
was supported by evidence showing that the defendant had "fired at least one shot at
the alleged victim." Certainly, under Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S. Ct.
2450 (1979), no "presumption" of specific intent to kill can arise from the mere use of
a dangerous weapon.
89. For an excellent discussion of this problem, See Billy J. Tauzin, Note, Impossible
Attempts, 26 La. L. Rev. 426 (1966).
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in fact stolen,90 the offender's mere (albeit reasonable) belief that the
goods were stolen does not suffice to complete the elements of the
offense under the terms of Article 69. Nevertheless, as is reflected by
the original comments to Article 69, the offender may be guilty of an
attempt to receive stolen goods. Interestingly, the comment provides the
above noted example:
If the offender merely thinks they have been stolen, when
in fact they have not, the possibility of an indictment for an
attempt to commit this offense would not be precluded. For
instance, if a trap were set for a suspected receiver of stolen
things, and he actually took some "planted" goods into his
possession, the circumstance that the goods were not in fact
stolen goods would be defense. However, the individual in ques-
tion would possibly be guilty of an attempt to receive stolen
things.9
These comments were included in the original Code and provide
possibly the best insight into the way the redactors suggest resolving a
problem which has divided courts throughout this country.9
One view of the matter is for the court to treat the issue presented
above as a "legal impossibility," which precludes any culpability for
either the completed or the attempted offense. Proponents of this view
would argue that the defendant did the acts intended and, having done
them, failed to commit the offense intended. Thus, he cannot be guilty
of an attempt, for to make him guilty of an attempt would, in effect,
punish him solely for the formulation of criminal intent without requiring
that he do an act tending directly toward the accomplishment of an
act, which, if completed, would constitute an offense.
The hypothetical example of Lady Eldon bringing English lace back
from France without declaring it to Customs, believing it to be French
lace, presents a persuasive argument for the position that it is absurd
to punish for an attempt if the completed act would not actually con-
stitute the intended crime. Another example given is that of firing a
shot, specifically intending it to inflict a fatal wound, into a man who
has already died of unrelated natural causes. Can this be attempted
murder?
90. See State v. Ngyen, 367 So. 2d 342 (La. 1979).
91. La. R.S. 14:69, comment.
92. Compare People v. Rojas, 358 P.2d 921 (Cal. 1961) with Booth v. State, 398
P.2d 863 (Okla. Cr. App. 1964).
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Similarly, can an offender be guilty of attempting to possess a
controlled dangerous substance if he purchases a substance which he
reasonably believes to be cocaine (but which is a fake bearing the
appearance of cocaine) from an undercover police officer posing as a
"street dealer?''"
The redactors' comments under Article 69 clearly imply that such
situations should be treated as mere "factual impossibilities" which do
not preclude culpability for the attempt. The redactors' original com-
ments to the attempt article state that the article adopts the so-called
"Canadian view" which provides that mere factual impossibility would
not preclude the offender from being guilty of an attempt.
The comment to Article 27 provides:
This section adopts the Canadian view that it is immaterial
whether there is an actual possibility of committing the intended
offense. An attempted homicide may fail because the gun used
is defective or the poison used is not sufficiently deadly. An
attempted rape may fail because the perpetrator is impotent; or
an attempted theft may fail because the cash drawer looted or
the pocket picked is empty. Where such conditions preventing
the consummation of the crime are unknown to the offender,
they do not prevent his being liable for an attempt. The essential
elements are an actual specific intent to commit the offense,
and an overt act directed toward that end. The subjective mental
element is all-important in this offense. Of course, it will be
impossible to entertain a specific intent to commit an offense
unless the offender has an apparent (to him) ability to consum-
mate the crime.
The original comments to both Articles 27 and 69 appear to adopt
the view that an offender is guilty of an attempt if he acts with a
specific intent to engage in conduct which in fact constitutes an offense
prescribed under Louisiana law and does an act which he reasonably
believes will tend directly toward the accomplishment of his intended
object. This view punishes the formation of genuine criminal intent when
the offender clearly manifests by his actions an intent to carry out that
criminal purpose. Such a position is consistent with a view that the law
does not punish the mere formation of criminal intent.
The attempt article adopted the generally accepted rule that "mere
preparation" is not sufficient, and there must be some act "tending
93. See United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.




directly toward the accomplishing" of the offender's criminal purpose.
The distinction between preparation and a sufficient overt act is one of
nearness and degree which generally defies more concise and detailed
definition. However, in conformity with then-existing more limited "lying
in wait" laws,94 Article 27 expressly provides that one who arms himself
with a dangerous weapon and lies in wait or searches for the intended
victim, but is apprehended before the victim appears, is guilty of an
attempt. But for this special clause, such activity would probably be
held insufficient for attempt liability.9'
Thus, the "lying in wait" and "searching" provisions are really
exceptions to the general provision that "mere preparation" is insuf-
ficient. Hence, "lying in wait" without a dangerous weapon and "search-
ing for the intended victim" without a dangerous weapon would not
be sufficient to constitute an attempt.
An important distinction between these inchoate defenses (conspiracy
and attempt) should be noted. Conspiracy requires an additional element,
i.e., a combination or agreement of parties. This combination or agree-
ment for the purpose of committing a crime is a separate offense. Thus,
the conspiracy article expressly recognizes the generally accepted common
law rule that where the conspirators have committed the crime planned
they may be tried for either the conspiracy, the basic offense, or both."
As has been recognized by the Louisiana jurisprudence in cases such
as the second circuit's opinion in State v. Joles,97 the Louisiana con-
spiracy article is "bilateral" in nature; a true combination of minds is
required. Thus, if an individual "conspires with" an undercover police
officer to commit a crime, there can be no conspiracy under Louisiana
law. There is no true "combination of minds" because the officer does
not actually intend to complete the offense. Although the state of mind
and the conduct of the defendant might otherwise be sufficient for
culpability as a conspirator, the absence of the "second criminal mind"
precludes criminal liability for conspiracy.
Because the attempt is only the first step in the commission of the
crime, Article 27 states the well-settled rule that an attempt is a "lesser
grade of the intended crime." Applying the rule governing prosecution
94. 1892 La. Acts No. 26, Dart's Crim. Stats. § 1092 (1932) punished lying in wait
to commit specified dangerous crimes.
95. In People v. Rizzo, 158 N.E. 888 (N.Y. 1927), the defendant and his fellow
gangsters toured the city seeking a paymaster they sought to rob, but were apprehended
before they located their victim. The court complimented the New York police upon their
alertness in preventing a dangerous crime, but released the offender on the ground that
since he had not found the paymaster at the time of his arrest he was not near enough
to the accomplishment of the crime to be guilty of a criminal attempt.
96. Hymen Knopf, Note, 17 Cornell L. Rev. 136 (1931). See also United States v.
Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992).
97. 485 So. 2d 212, 214 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
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for lesser and included offenses, upon commission of a crime the of-
fender may be prosecuted for either the completed crime or for an
attempt to commit that crime, but not for both. This choice of pro-
secutions, which is generally available as to lesser included offenses, is
expressly recognized in the third paragraph of Article 27.98
Louisiana courts have consistently and correctly held that the leg-
islature did not intend to apply the inchoate offenses to one another.
Thus, courts have held that there can be no attempt to conspire or
attempt to attempt. Similarly, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held
in State v. EamesP and State v. Dyer'00 that the legislature did not
intend for the general attempt article to apply to offenses which are
themselves in the nature of an attempt. In Eames, the court set aside
a conviction for attempted inciting to riot on the theory that the inciting
offense is itself in the nature of an attempt. In Dyer, the court held
that there can be no attempt to carry a concealed weapon because the
offense of carrying a concealed weapon is itself in the nature of an
attempt. Whether or not one agrees with the ultimate resolution of these
cases, it is logical for the supreme court to conclude that the general
attempt article was not intended to apply to offenses which the court
finds are themselves in the nature of an attempt.
In a similar but unrelated vein, the supreme court has held that the
general attempt article cannot apply to crimes like negligent homicide
and felony murder because the specific intent requirement of attempt
is totally inconsistent with criminal negligence or an unintentional killing.' 0'
During the fifty years that have elapsed since the enactment of the
Criminal Code there have been many significant changes in Louisiana
criminal procedure and in Louisiana substantive criminal law. Those
changes reflect the efforts of the legislature to address major societal
problems, such as the rampant abuse of controlled dangerous substances,
by the enactment of criminal laws. Those changes will be addressed by
the authors in a subsequent article which is currently in preparation.
The fact that such major changes have been adopted in the sub-
stantive definition of crimes and the procedure to be followed in the
adjudication phase makes more remarkable the absence of basic changes
in the Criminal Code's doctrinal provisions, defenses, and theories of
culpability . These provisions have obviously been subjected to the "test
of time" and apparently have served to produce just results.
98. "[A]ny person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although it
appears on the trial that the crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by
such person .. " La. Crim. Code art. 27 (1942).
99. 365 So. 2d 1361 (La. 1978).
100. 388 So. 2d 374 (La. 1980).
101. State v. Adams, 210 La. 782, 28 So. 2d 269 (1947).
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